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ADMISSIBILITY OF COMPUTER-KEPT
BUSINESS RECORDS
In 1950 approximately ten to fifteen computers were in use in the
United States, primarily for experimental purposes. By 1966 some
35,200 computers were in active business use, and it is predicted that
by 1975 this number will jump to 85,000.1 The vast majority of com-
puters now being used in business and industry serve record-keeping
functions.2 This rapid development of the computer in business
presents new questions regarding the admissibility of computer-kept
records under the laws of evidence as they exist today and as they
would exist upon enactment of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence."
I
AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTERS
A. In General
An understanding of the unique evidentiary problems generic to
computers requires at least an elementary grasp of how computers
work. The following is a necessarily simplified outline of the function-
ing of a stored-program digital computer, the most common variety of
computer and the one most widely used by business to maintain
records.
Almost all computers consist of four' basic elements. These are:
(a) input-output devices; (b) storage devices; (c) arithmetic and logical
units; and (d) a control unit.4 All information that is to be stored in the
computer's memory is first translated from readable form into machine
language. This can entail the use of punch cards, magnetic tapes,
paper tapes, or transparent film. Once the information is in this- form,
it can be fed into the computer through the input device. The infor-
I McCarthy, Information, SciENTIFc Am., Sept. 1966, at 65, 67. The figures appeared
in a report published by the American Federation of Information Processing Societies.
2 Computers are performing other functions, and it is predicted that they will
eventually play a part in the decision-making process. Tomeo, I.B.M. v. Wigmore: The
Case for Cybernated Evidence, THE STARR RE., April 1966, at 3.
3 COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED
STATES DISTsuCr COURTS AND MAGISTRATES (1969) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED FED. R.
EVID.].
4 Furth, Compteirs, in COMPUTERS AND THE LAW 26, 30-31 (2d ed. R. Bigelow 1969).
1033
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
mation is thereby placed in the storage device, which can be best
thought of as the computer's memory bank. These storage devices can
either be entirely internal (called "cores") or external in the form of
magnetic tapes, disks, cards, or drums that can be removed from the
computer and filed so as to give the machine, in effect, an unlimited
capacity for memory. Arithmetic and logical units are the circuitry
and components of the machine that perform the binary operations
the machine is called upon to do. The operation and procedure of
these units is regulated by the control unit, which in turn responds
to orders given it by means of a "program."5
Once the machine has digested all the information fed to it
through the input device, it can be called upon, by utilizing a pro-
gram, to search its memory for a particular piece, or any number of
pieces, of information; perform a series of arithmetic computations
with this information; and then spew forth the results. The process
by which it reports its findings is performed by the output device. In
most cases, the output device delivers information that is still only in
machine-readable form. Therefore, a further process is necessary to
convert this information into English prose. More advanced com-
puters, however, are capable of producing print-outs in English.
B. Maintaining Records with a Computer
Use of a computer results in a substantial departure from tradi-
tional methods and procedures of record-keeping. Consequently, the
type of evidence available, its reliability, and its usefulness in a trial
proceeding are variously affected. It is appropriate to highlight some
of the critical differences between computer-kept records and tradi-
tional records.
Obviously, one of the most appealing characteristics of a computer
is the incredible speed with which it can perform various operations.
In doing so, however, the machine shortcuts many of the intermediary
steps that would have to be taken if the same computations were per-
formed manually. No written records are retained as to the process
through which the machine went to arrive at its final conclusions; all
the machine's calculations are carried on internally in response to the
directives of the program. Evidence of the process the computer per-
formed in arriving at its final product, if needed, could be no more
than circumstantial proof as to the contents of the machine's memory,
the program used, and the machine's capacity and ability to perform
that program. This is not to say that a computer could not record each
5 Id. at 31.
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separate calculation that it makes in arriving at its final conclusion. If
it were asked to do so, it would indeed deliver a print-out at each step
of its process. Computers, however, are rarely used in this way due to
the great increase in time and expense such use would entail.
Another obvious difference between traditional records and com-
puter-kept records is in the physical form of the record. In almost
every case, the record as contained in the computer's storage device
would be of little or no use. Since it must be translated into English,
a computer print-out is subject to the objection that it is a document
created especially for trial and therefore not properly a business record
exception to the hearsay rule.6
Traditional record-keeping systems are usually cumulative; each
new entry is added to the prior entries that comprise the permanent
records. The present state of affairs is ascertainable, and so, by back-
tracking, is the state of the record at any prior time. In a computerized
system, on the other hand, it is typically the practice to keep records
up to date by combining old records with new entries, thereby de-
stroying the old records and making it impossible to ascertain the
state of the record at any prior time.7 This is done because of the great
speed with which the entire record can be copied and the new material
integrated.
The computer offers unique opportunities for fraudulent record
alteration. Since the record can be erased as easily as standard record-
ing tape, and since no prior records are available to check consistency
or continuity, safeguards must be established to ensure against tamper-
ing. At the present time the greatest safeguard is the aura of complexity
that shrouds the computer. Few people have the knowledge necessary
to tamper successfully with the machine; tampering would require a
detailed knowledge of how computers work and of the program and
procedure being used in the particular computer involved. However,
as more people learn about computers and their operation, such
further safeguards as codes, restricted access to machines, and periodic
compilation of records may become necessary to protect against the
possibility of fraudulent alteration of records.8
Although computers have been known to malfunction as the
result of internal failures of transistors and magnetic distortion, er-
0 See 5 J. WIGMoRE, TREATISE ON Evm.NcE §§ 1522-23, 1525-26, 1532 (3d ed. 1940).
7 Freed, Evidence, in COMPUTERS AND THE LAw, supra note 4, at 139, 141.
8 It appears that judges and commentators have not directly confronted this problem
or even referred to it in more than a cursory manner. This is startling in light of its
obvious importance to the questions whether the business record rule should apply to
computer print-outs and what weight should be given these records as evidence.
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rors are much more likely to be caused by external factors. A power
failure, even a power decrease for a split second, can cause a computer
to make grievous errors. Today, however, most computers have built-
in devices that notify the operator in the event of a power lag or in-
ternal disparity.
Since the machine can perform so quickly and inexpensively,
the usual test for detecting machine errors is to rerun the same pro-
gram either simultaneously or successively, and compare the results
for consistency. The same test uncovers any purely clerical human
error, but unfortunately does not reveal an invalid, incomplete, or
erroneous program. Experience has shown that many errors stem from
human oversight by a programmer, coder, or operator. The computer
is thus limited by the accuracy and validity of the information fed to
it and the skill of the programmer who seeks to process and extract
that information.
Most mistakes result from faulty programming.9 Where a very
complex program involving hundreds of individual instructions is
used, each instruction can be run separately on the computer and
the result checked before the program is run as a whole. This tech-
nique is called "debugging" and works relatively well, though not in-
fallibly.
II
EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS UNDER EXISTING LAW
Since computer print-outs are written or documentary evidence
made out of court and not subject to the tests of cross-examination,
they are clearly hearsay if offered for the truth of their contents. 0
Print-outs are also targets for objection on the ground that they are
secondary evidence as to the state of the true record that is contained
in the computer, or of the information originally fed into the com-
puter, and therefore in violation of the best evidence rule.1
A. The Hearsay Objection
Prior to Vosburgh v. Thayer,12 shop-books and business records
were barred from introduction into evidence by the hearsay rule.
9 Freed, Computer Print-Outs as Evidence, in 16 Am. JuR. PROOF OF FACTs 273, 298
(1965).
10 See C. McCoRmicK, LAW OF EvDENCE § 225 (1954); 5 J. WirmoRao, supra note 6, at
§§ 1361-62.
11 C. McCoRMICK, supra note 10, at § 195. Most of the problems discussed herein
could best be dealt with-by pre-trial stipulations between counsel. This is probably the
general practice and may account for the surprising dearth of cases involving these issues.
32 12 Johns. 461 (N.Y. 1815).
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After that landmark case, however, a limited exception was made
where the proponent of the evidence could establish that there were
regular dealings between the parties, that he kept honest and fair
books, and that no regular clerk was employed who could testify first-
- hand to the entries. These guidelines were followed in most jurisdic-
tions for more than one hundred years, until it was apparent that
rigid adherence to the limitations on admissibility had no relation to
the realities of accepted business practice. 13
Prompted by dissatisfaction with the existing rules and by belief
that there is little motive for a businessman to falsify records essential
to his very livelihood, jurisdiction after jurisdiction adopted some
form of statutory exception to the hearsay rule in the case of business
records.' 4 In content and effect, most of the statutes adopted were
strikingly similar. For purposes of analysis, the development that took
place in New York will be used as an example.' 5
In New York, prior to 1928, business records were treated under
the "shop-book rule," which permitted their introduction "provided
they were made in the regular course of business, contemporaneously
or within a reasonable time after the transaction recorded, by a person
unavailable as a witness, who had personal knowledge of the event
and no motive to misrepresent or misstate."' 6 This rule was super-
seded in 1928 by the enactment of New York Civil Practice Act sec-
tion 374-a.' 7 With the enactment of the 1963 New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules, section 374-a was changed slightly in wording, but not
in substance, and became what is the present law of New York.'8 New
York C.P.L.R. rule 4518(a) reads:
13 The routine of modem affairs, mercantile, financial and industrial, is con-
ducted with so extreme a division of labor that the transactions cannot be
proved at first hand without the concurrence of persons, each of whom can con-
tribute no more than a slight part, and that part not dependent on his memory
of the event. Records, and records alone, are their adequate repository, and are
in practice accepted as accurate upon the faith of the routine itself, and of the
self-consistency of their contents. Unless they can be used in court without the
task of calling those who at all stages had a part in the transactions recorded,
nobody need ever pay a debt, if only his creditor does a large enough business.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 18 F.2d 934, 937 (2d Cir.
1927) (Learned Hand, J.). See also 5 J. WIGMoRE, supra note 6, at § 1530.
14 See Note, Revised Business Entry Statutes: Theory and Practice, 48 COLum. L.
REv. 920 (1948).
15 New York has adopted the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act along with
27 other states. 9A UNIFORm LAws ANN. 504-31 (1965). The federal government has
adopted similar legislation as the Federal Business Records Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1964).
16 E. FiscH, Nmv YoRK EvmNcE § 831, at 410 (1959); see Vosburgh v. Thayer, 12
Johns. 461 (N.Y. 1815).
17 Law of March 23, 1928, ch. 532, § 374-a, (19 28 ] N.Y. Laws 1158.
18 N.Y. Crv. Pr-C. LAw R 4518 (McKinney 1963).
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Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book
or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transac-
tion, occurrence or event, shall be admissible in evidence as proof
of that act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the judge finds that
it was made in the regular course of any business and that it was
the regular course of such business to make it, at the time of the
act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time
thereafter. All other circumstances of the making of the memo-
randum or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the
maker, may be proved to affect its weight, but they shall not affect
its admissibility. The term business includes a business, profession,
occupation and calling of every kind.x9
In considering admissibility of computer print-outs the threshold
question, of course, is whether a computer print-out qualifies as a
"writing or record." Although there is no precedent in New York on
this specific point, cases indicate that no particular form or type of
record is required to satisfy the statute20 and that records kept by a
computer would be included within the broad language, "whether in
the form of an entry in a book or otherwise."
Given a record, the New York statute sets forth three principal
tests that must be met for admissibility. The first and most trouble-
some requirement is that the writing or record must have been made
in the regular course of business. In the case of a computer-kept record,
this presents a problem; although it may well be the regular course
of business to feed the information into the computer's storage device,
it is seldom the practice to print out readable excerpts from the ma-
chine's memory bank until necessary for a specific purpose. Therefore,
the print-out is arguably not a writing or record made in the regular
course of business, but is rather a document prepared especially for
trial and at best a copy of the real record, which exists within the
computer.
No case in New York has ever directly addressed this question,
nor has a clear definition of "regular course of business" ever been
articulated. The meaning of that phrase has apparently been relegated
to the murky province of the trial judge's "sound discretion." 21
The first case to deal with the admissibility of computer print-
outs as business records was Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib.22 This
Nebraska case remains the landmark decision and has been relied
19 Id. R 4518(a).
20 Cf. Mayole v. B. Crystal & Sons, 266 App. Div. 1008, 44 N.Y.S.2d 411 (2d Dep't
1943); In re Borden's Will, 41 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 267 App. Div. 823, 47
N.Y.S.2d 120 (2d Dep't 1944).
21 See Williams v. Alexander, 309 N.Y. 283, 129 NXE,2d 417 (1955).
22 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965).
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upon heavily by the few other jurisdictions that have passed on the
question.2 3 In Seib, defendant opposed the admission of print-outs on
the ground that they were prepared especially for trial and therefore
were not "made in the regular course of business" as required by the
Nebraska statute. The court rejected this argument:
The retrieval from the taped record . . . was made for the pur-
poses of the trial. But, the taped record and the information and
calculations thereon were made in the usual course of business
and for the purpose of the business alone.24
In admitting the print-out because the taped record satisfied the
statutory test, the court arguably departed from the Nebraska statute,
which provides:
A record of an act, condition, or event, shall, insofar as relevant,
be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness
testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it
was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of
the act, condition, or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the
sources of information, method, and time of preparation were such
as to justify its admission. 25
At least with respect to records not kept by computer, it is clear that
what must satisfy the statutory tests is the record itself, not the source
from which the record is drawn. The court's decision may be justified
for two reasons. First, in the context of computers, the reference to
"the sources of information" may indicate an ambiguity in the statute,
because it could be interpreted to require that either the computer
record or the print-out be "made in the regular course of business."
Second, the requirement that the evidence be identified and attested
to by "the custodian or other qualified witness" may offer enough in-
surance against falsification to permit expanding the statute to include
computer print-outs. In Seib, the proponent of the print-outs went to
great lengths in describing its record-keeping practices, the method it
followed in producing the print-outs in question, and the chain of
identity of these print-outs. This foundation was of paramount im-
portance in convincing the court of the truth and accuracy of the
evidence and therefore in achieving admission of the print-outs. 26
23 E.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Knox Homes Corp., 343 F.2d 887, 896 (5th Cir. 1965);
Merrick v. United States Rubber Co., 7 Ariz. App. 43, 436, 440 P.2d 314, 317 (1968)
(involving a statute identical to Nebraska's); King v. Mississippi ex rel. Murdock Ac-
ceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 893, 398 (Miss. 1969).
24 178 Neb. at 260, 132 N.W.2d at 875.
25 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-12,109 (1964).
26 178 Neb. at 257, 132 N.W.2d at 874. See also Comment, Computer Print-Outs of
Business Records and Their Admissibility in New York, 31 ALBANY L. RPv. 61 (1967).
1039
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Most writers on the subject feel that the Seib rationale could be
applied to the New York statute.27 However, the New York statute
differs substantially from the Nebraska statute. It specifies clearly that
it is the "writing or record" sought to be introduced, not the source
from which the writing was taken, that must be made in the regular
course of business. Furthermore, it has no provision analogous to
Nebraska's "sources of information" clause. Thus, whereas the Ne-
braska court in Seib could admit the print-out on the grounds that
its "sources of information, method, and time of preparation were
such as to justify its admission" and that the taped records from which
it came "were made in the usual course of business and for the pur-
pose of the business alone," no such reasoning could be relied upon
by a New York court. Furthermore, since the New York statute does
not require that a "custodian or other qualified witness" identify
and attest to the accuracy of the evidence, the result of applying the
Nebraska court's reasoning would be that any study, compilation, or
summary made especially for trial, no matter how subjective or self-
serving, could gain admission if its basic source material was a record
made in the regular course of business. Clearly, the framers of the
statute did not intend this result.
The other two principal tests for admissibility of business records
under the New York statute are that the regular course of business
involve and include the keeping of records, and that the memoran-
dum or record be made at the time of the transaction, event, or occur-
rence, or within a reasonable time thereafter. 2 The former offers little
difficulty where it can be shown that the computer is regularly used
for keeping the records. The latter, however, presents a problem.
In using a computer to keep records, it is customary to feed in-
formation into the machine as the information becomes available.
Therefore, the information in the storage device is not arranged in
orderly form but rather is spread helter-skelter along the memory tape
or coil. To produce a meaningful record, the machine must be in-
structed (programmed) to collect the particular information and print
it out in whatever format or order is desired. This print-out is then
the "memorandum or record" sought to be introduced. In most cases,
the "transaction, occurrence or event" of which the print-out is evi-
dence occurred years before the print-out was made; therefore it is
27 Tomeo, supra note 2, at 3; Comment, supra note 26, at 73. See also Louisville &
N.R.R. v. Knox Homes Corp., 343 F.2d 887, 896 n.37 (5th Cir. 1965), citing Seib with
approval and noting the substantial similarity between the Nebraska statute and the
federal law. Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 358 F.2d 625, 632 n.6 (5th Cir. 1966).
28 E.g., Shea v. McKeon, 264 App. Div. 573, 35 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Ist Dep't 1942).
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difficult to establish that this memorandum or record was made
"within a reasonable time" after that transaction, event, or occurrence.
Since the probable intent of the "reasonable time" requirement is to
avoid the reliance on fallible human memory,29 the objection ought
to be overcome by a showing that the information was fed into the
computer within a reasonable time, regardless of when the print-out
was made. 0 This reasoning, however, flies in the face of the statutory
language.
The hearsay problems raised by computer print-outs are more
easily dealt with in jurisdictions having no statutory business records
exception. 31 In King v. Mississippi ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp.,32
the Mississippi Supreme Court extended the shop-book rule to include
computer print-outs, holding that such print-outs are admissible
without the necessity of identifying, locating, and producing as witnesses
individuals who made entries in the regular course of business. The
court laid down a series of guidelines for future admission of computer
print-outs of business records. These guidelines resemble those con-
tained in the Nebraska business records statute, but seem to permit
the trial court more discretion in determining the reliability of the
evidence. Under the guidelines, computer print-outs are admissible
if the print-outs are relevant and material and it can be shown:
(1) that the electronic computing equipment is recognized as stan-
dard equipment, (2) the entries are made in the regular course of
business at or reasonably near the time of the happening of the
event recorded, and (3) the foundation testimony satisfies the court
that the sources of information, method and time of preparation
29 C. McCoRmicK, supra note 10, at § 285.
30 This objection was not raised in Seib, but the court seemed to be addressing it
when it said:
The taped record furnished a cumulative record based on information flowing
into the office of the plaintiff company day by day and fed into the machine
in response to a systematic procedure for processing each insured's account.
In terms of the statute, we are of the opinion that the "sources of informa-
tion, method, and time of preparation" were such as to justify its ... admission.
178 Neb. at 259, 132 N.W.2d at 875.
31 Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia have no statutory provisions permit-
ting business records to be introduced in evidence over the objection of the hearsay rule.
Maine may not either; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 356 (1964), is ambiguous and appears
to make admissibility discretionary with the court.
Among the remaining states, only Iowa and Florida expressly exempt electronically-
stored records from the hearsay rule. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.36(2) (Supp. 1969); IowA CODE
ANN. § 62228 (Supp. 1970).
32 222 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1969).
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were such as to indicate its trustworthiness and justify its admis-
sion.33
The court's use of the word "entries" and not "record" or "mem-
orandum" in the second requisite eliminates a major problem caused
by the various statutes. The first requirement is not clear; the court
was apparently concerned that the scientific reliability of the particu-
lar computer be established. The last requisite is flexible enough in
its wording, yet clear enough in its intent, to be of great value to the
courts. The Mississippi court seems well aware of the potential danger
of fraudulent alteration where computer evidence is involved. This
awareness is reflected in its determination that the probative value of
print-outs is the same as conventional books and that they are there-
fore subject to refutation to the same extent. 4
B. The Best Evidence Rule
Simply stated, the best evidence rule demands that the content of
a writing be proved by the original document; a copy of the original is
inadmissible unless the original's absence can be satisfactorily ex-
plained.3 5
Once again the threshold question is whether a computer print-
out is a "writing" or merely "real evidence."36 If it is a writing, which
it most likely is, then it is clearly a copy of the original record that
is contained within the computer. Furthermore, the true original is
most likely a document from which the information fed into the com-
puter was taken, and this document was most likely destroyed by the
proponent party.37
Fortunately, there are a growing number of exceptions to the best
evidence rule, many of which would encompass a computer print-out.
The first exception is one of necessity: if the original documents are so
numerous or complicated that their production would be burdensome
and of little probative value to the court or jury, a summary or extract
33 Id. at 398.
34 Id. at 399.
35 C. McCostaCK, supra note 10, at §§ 195-97; J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE 484-87 (1898).
36 Under UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENCE 1(13), a "writing" is defined very broadly and
would probably include a computer print-out.
37 For the sake of convenience, companies that employ computers for record-keeping
generally keep the original receipts and invoices for only a short period of time after
the information contained thereon is fed into the computer. After this time period has
lapsed, the original documents are destroyed leaving only the computer-kept record as
evidence of the transactions. See generally Freed, supra note 9, at 296.
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may be admissible within the trial judge's discretion. 8 Another excep-
tion, which would apply in the case of an objection on the ground that
the original documents were destroyed by the proponent of the print-
out, is that secondary evidence is admissible where the original, though
destroyed by the proponent party, was not destroyed in bad faith. 9
Perhaps the most applicable exception is made when the court finds
that the original documents were destroyed in the ordinary course of
business.40
In New York the best evidence rule would not present any real
problem to the admission of computer print-outs for New York has
adopted a modified form of the Uniform Photographic Copies of Busi-
ness and Public Records as Evidence Act.41 Although this statute has
been narrowly construed in New York42 and no cases have been
decided as to whether its scope would encompass computer print-outs,
a liberal reading of the statute would permit their admission in spite
of their status as secondary evidence.43
C. Weight Afforded Print-Out Record Evidence
It is most unlikely that any court would bar admission of com-
puter-produced evidence solely on the ground that it may contain
errors,44 since the same is true of traditional man-made records. The
Seib court believed that although testimony as to the reliability of
computers was not relevant in determining whether print-outs should
be admitted into evidence, such testimony was relevant in determining
8 Public Operating Corp. v. Weingart, 257 App. Div. 379, 13 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1st
Dep't 1939) (dictum).
89 See Sellmayer Parking Co. v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 707, 710-12 (4th Cir. 1944);
C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 10, § 201, at 414 & n.11.
40 Steele v. Lord, 70 N.Y. 280, 38 N.Y.S. 826 (1877).
41 N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw R 4539 (McKinney 1963) states:
If any business, institution, or member of a profession or calling, in the
regular course of business or activity has made, kept or recorded any writing,
entry, print or representation and in the regular course of business has recorded,
copied, or reproduced it by any process which accurately reproduces or forms a
durable medium for reproducing the original, such reproduction, when satisfac-
torily identified, is as admissible in evidence as the original, whether the original
is in existence or not, and an enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction is
admissible in evidence if the original reproduction is in existence and available
for inspection under direction of the court. The introduction of a reproduction
does not predude admission of the original.
42 Toho Bussan Kaisha, Ltd. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 265 F.2d 418, 423
(2d Cir. 1959).
43 See 9A UNmFoRm LAws ANN. 580-82 (1965); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 1356 (1961).
44 For discussion of computer accuracy in keeping business records, see text at notes
8-9 supra.
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the weight to be attached to such evidence once admitted. 5 The same
rule probably applies under the New York statute; probable reliability
need not be demonstrated to admit the business record, and "[a]ll
other circumstances of the making of the memorandum or record...
may be proved to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its admis-
sibility."46 It may be necessary, therefore, for the proponent of the
print-outs to produce detailed explanations of all stages and procedures
of its computer operation and to stress safeguards used to ensure accu-
racy and reliability. Such testimony would be most effective if it came
from a supervisor of computer operations or other expert who is ap-
prised of all aspects of the operation.
Presentation of testimony regarding accuracy is difficult, since
failure to stress safeguards may lead to objection on the ground of
dubious reliability, while too heavy emphasis on error detection may
leave the court and the jury with the impression that computers are
error-prone. In each case some measure of balance must be struck be-
tween these two possible pitfalls.
III
Ti PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
The Federal Business Records Act,47 which is presently in effect
in the federal courts, is similar to New York's statute.48 There are no
cases interpreting the federal statute, although a recent decision indi-
cates that computer print-outs would fall within its reach.4 9 Any
federal decision construing the statute would naturally have strong per-
suasive force on states with similar statutes. At the present time, how-
ever, the federal rules of evidence are being revised by the Advisory
Committee of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. Their specific
proposals might affect the admissibility of computer print-outs and the
best evidence rule.
45 178 Neb. at 258-59, 132 N.V.2d at 875. See also King v. Mississippi ex rel. Murdock
Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393, 399 (Miss. 1969). The degree to which reliability can
be established will become the critical factor in litigation involving computer evidence.
For an excellent discussion see Freed, supra note 9, at 310-16.
46 N.Y. Civ. PRFAc. LAW R 4518(a) (McKinney 1968).
47 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1964).
48 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw R 4518(a) (McKinney 1963).
49 Olympic Ins. Co. v. H.D. Harrison, Inc., 418 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1969). Although
this case was dismissed on other grounds, the court observed that where print-outs were
produced in the ordinary course of business, they had "a prima fade aura of reliability,"
and that there was no error in relying on them as a basis for summary judgment where
the opposing party failed to make any specific objections as to their accuracy. Id. at 670.
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A. Hearsay
In confronting the business record exception the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence settled upon a some-
what expanded version of the Uniform Business Records as Evidence
Act. Rule 8-03 of the Proposed Rules states in part:
HEARSAY ExcEPTIONS: AvAILABILITY oF DECLARANT IMMATERIAL
(a) GENERAL PROVISIONS. A statement is not excluded by the
hearsay rule if its nature and the special circumstances under
which it was made offer assurances of accuracy not likely to be
enhanced by calling the declarant as a witness, even though he is
available.
(b) ILLUSTRATIONS. By way of illustration only, and not by
way of limitation, the following are examples of statements con-
forming with the requirements of this rule:
(6) RECORDS OF REGULARLY CONDUCTED ACTIV-
ITY. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any
form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at
or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person
with knowledge, all in the course of a regularly conducted activity,
as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified wit-
ness, unless the source of information or the method or circum-
stances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. 50
Although the Committee was aware of the use of computers in business
record-keeping, 51 it was seemingly unaware of the principal problems
involved in using print-outs as evidence; as a result its proposal offers
little improvement over the present situation.
A computer print-out unquestionably is a form of "data compila-
tion" under rule 8-03(b)(6). However, many print-outs are not made
"at or near" the time of the acts or events recorded. In addition, many
print-outs are made especially for trial and will be objectionable as
not made "in the course of a regularly conducted activity." The Com-
mittee has not dealt adequately with these realities of computer opera-
tions. The reference to compilations "made... by, or from informa-
tion transmitted by, a person with knowledge" raises a new problem,
since the print-out may contain information transmitted by another
50 PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 8-03.
51 The Advisory Committee's note on rule 8-03(b)(6) does not specifically refer to
the problems of computer print-outs, but does say that "[t]he expression 'data compila-
tion' is used as broadly descriptive of any means of storing information other than the
conventional words and figures in written or documentary form. It includes, but is by
no means limited to, electronic computer storage." Id., Advisory Committee's Comments
to Rule 8-03, at 190. See also id. 9-01 and accompanying note by the Advisory Committee
(expansion of ancient document rule to include data compilations).
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computer. Human involvement could be found by tracing the chain of
transmission but perhaps not before losing the desired form of the
information. It is thus unclear whether rule 8-03(b)(6) is limited to
first-cycle print-outs. Notwithstanding the proviso that examples are
"by way of illustration only," these restrictions are likely to exclude
many print-outs if adopted as proposed and if strictly construed.
Fortunately, the Committee chose to include the requirement of
foundation testimony by a "custodian or other qualified witness," and
further provided for exclusion of evidence where its "source... or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthi-
ness." Hopefully these provisions will ensure against fraudulent altera-
tion.
B. Best Evidence
The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence deal more effectively
with the problems raised by computer print-outs under the best evi-
dence rule. The traditional rule requiring production of the original
of a document to prove its contents is restated by the Committee to
include writings, recordings, and photographs.5 2 This rule seems to
add little to prior law until coupled with certain definitions in rule
10-01:
(a) WRITINGS AND RECORDINGS. "Writings" and "record-
ings" consist of letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set
down by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photo-
graphing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or
other form of data compilation.
(c) ORIGINAL. An' "original" of a writing or recording is the
writing or recording itself or any counterpart intended to have the
same effect by a person executing or issuing it .... If data are
stored in a computer or similar device, any print-out or other
output readable by sight, shown accurately to reflect the data, is
an "original." 53
Under these definitions, a computer print-out is an "original" if it can
be shown accurately to reflect the data that it represents. Thus, founda-
tion testimony is still required to establish the print-out's accuracy and
reliability. The enactment of such a rule would provide a realistic
52 The general rule is set down in rule 10-02, entitled "Requirement of Original."
The rule reads: "To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the
original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in
these rules or by Act of Congress." Id. 10-02.
s 3 Id. 10-01.
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solution to the problems of computer print-outs and the best evidence
rule.54
CONCLUSION
At first blush, jurisdictions that are still functioning under the
common law rules of evidence are in an envious position with respect
to the proper handling of computer print-outs; they can create specific
rules for handling print-out evidence without being confined by the
wording of a statute that gives little or no attention to computers.
However, the adoption of the various business record statutes does not
54 The Advisory Committee notes:
Present day techniques have expanded methods of storing data, yet the essential
form which the information ultimately assumes for usable purposes is words and
figures. Hence the considerations underlying the rule dictate its expansion to
include computers, photographic systems, and other modem developments.
Id., Advisory Committee's Comments to Rule 10-01, at 235. The Committee then goes on
to say, in reference to rule 10-01(c):
In most instances, what is an original or the original will be self-evident and
further refinement will be unnecessary. However, in some instances particularized
definition is required .... While strictly speaking the original of a photograph
might be thought to be only the negative, practicality and common usage require
that any print from the negative be regarded as an original. Similarly, practi-
cality and usage confer the status of original upon any computer printout. Trans-
port Indemnity Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965).
Id. It is not clear whether the analogy to a photographic negative is well-made. Alteration
of a photographic negative requires the use of a physical process that might be detected
by a close examination. The inner workings of a computer are not subject to comparable
scrutiny and can be altered or erased with very little danger of detection.
The actual effectiveness of the proposed federal best evidence rule would probably
turn upon the courts' subsequent interpretation of the extent of foundation testimony
required to show that the print-out accurately reflects the data it purports to represent.
The courts must require enough foundation testimony to uncover fraud without requiring
so much as to undermine the intent of the liberalized rule.
One remedy is suggested by rule 10-06, entitled "Summaries." This rule, born of
necessity and based on practicability, provides:
The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which cannot
conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart,
summary, or calculation. The originals shall be made available for examination
or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place. The judge
may order that they be produced in court.
Id. 10-06. Built into rule 10-06 is the safeguard of making original sources available to
the opposing parties. But if, in relation to the best evidence rule, print-outs are originals,
the effectiveness of rule 10-06 is somewhat limited. One possible solution would be to
extend this safeguard one step further and provide that the opposing party be per-
mitted access to the computer from which the print-outs were taken. This could be
done on court order at the request of either party, provided that computer experts
representing each party be present to witness the programming and procedure followed
in obtaining the print-out.
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preempt the common law, but merely supplements it.55 If a jurisdic-
tion wishes to treat the problem of computer-kept records indepen-
dently from ordinary business records, it could find that print-outs do
not fall within the scope of the statute and are therefore subject to
common law rules. Such a finding would then permit the court the
freedom to interpret the common law as the Mississippi court did, and
to create appropriate rules for the admission of such evidence without
impairing the existing rules applicable to ordinary business records.
Rigdon Reese*
55 This is certainly the case in New York. 5 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER,
Nmv YORK Civir. PRAcIICE § 4518.03 (1969). "[T]he statute did not repeal any prior doc-
trine permitting admissibility.... The shop-book rule, for example, is still viable ...."
Id. (emphasis in original). Also, in construing N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Low § 4543 (McKinney
1963), it has been stated:
Article 45 does not purport to be a full codification of the rules of evidence
and many common law doctrines are not referred to. It should be interpreted to
permit the courts to continue to develop the rules of evidence as they might have
without any statutes and rules to meet new problems.
J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, supra at § 4543.02. See also id. §§ 4517.28, 4518.16,
4518.23, 4540.07.
Wigmore, in speaking about the impact of adoption of one of the uniform statutes
on the common law, notes:
It is ... sometimes difficult to know whether the statute is to be regarded as
merely declaratory of the common law . . . or whether it must be taken as a
substitute replacing and excluding the common-law principle. Having regard to
the history of the parties'-books exception, it seems safer and more correct, as it
certainly is more advantageous, to regard these statutes as intended to enlarge or
to replace merely the parties'-books branch of the exception; so that whatever
principle there was at common law for the main exception ... remains unabol-
ished by these statutes. Their clauses, therefore, which deal with such entries of
persons deceased or absent, are merely declaratory and cumulative, and the re-
maining limitations or elements of the main exception at common law, unmen-
tioned in the statute, remain in force as at common law.
5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1519, at 361. Various jurisdictions have endorsed Wigmore's
opinion in cases that define the purpose of their respective statutes: in Ohio, the purpose
is "to liberalize and broaden the shop book rule ...." Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416,
425, 72 N.E.2d 245, 250 (1947); in Pennsylvania, the "purpose of [the act] was to enlarge the
old common-law shopbook exception to the hearsay rule. ... Fanceglia v. Harry, 409
Pa. 155, 158, 185 A.2d 598, 600 (1962). See also Richmond v. Frederick, 116 Cal. App. 2d
541, 253 P.2d 977 (1953); Argues v. National Superior Co., 67 Cal. App. 2d 763, 155 P.2d
648 (1945); Snowcraft & Sons Co. v. Roselle, 77 Idaho 142, 289 P.2d 621 (1955); Chillstrom
v. Trojan Seed Co., 242 Minn. 471, 65 N.W.2d 888 (1954); Rossomanno v. Laclede Cab Co.,
828 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1959); Douglas Creditors Ass'n v. Padelford, 181 Ore. 345, 182 P.2d
390 (1947); Cantrill v. American Mail Line, 42 Wash. 2d 590, 257 P.2d 179 (1953).
* Member of the third-year class, Cornell Law School.
